Arbitrary call with user-controlled target

Cap (cUSD / stcUSD)'s assessment for RD-F-013 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No arbitrary .call(target, data) with user-controlled target found in inspected contracts. VaultLogic.rescueERC20 uses SafeERC20.safeTransfer on a named asset address (not user-controlled). AccessControl functions are role-gated. No LIFI-class arbitrary call pattern found.

Sources #

GitHub
VaultLogic.sol — rescueERC20 Analysiscontracts/vault/libraries/VaultLogic.sol — rescueERC20 uses SafeERC20.safeTransfer, not arbitrary callretrieved 2026-05-17

Methodology #

Determine whether any contract performs `.call(target, data)` where target and/or data is user-supplied without a target allowlist or selector filter.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol cap factor RD-F-013 score green collected_at 2026-05-17 10:56:24