defirisk.co
rubric v1.7.0

Rescue/emergencyWithdraw without timelock

BlackRock USD Institutional Digital Liquidity Fund (BUIDL)'s assessment for RD-F-041 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

[PD-042 rescore 2026-05-12, v1.7.0+] Forcible seize / burn / retrieve-token paths are the defining feature of a regulated tokenized RWA, REQUIRED by KYC, sanctions, and court-order compliance regimes. Treating them as a rug-risk signal misframes the protocol type. Scored not_applicable per PD-042 (Cat 2 RWA-issuer subset). ORIGINAL EVIDENCE (preserved from v1.6.0 grading): seize() and omnibusSeize() allow ROLE_ISSUER to forcibly transfer tokens from any holder wallet. No timelock. Directly callable by admin. Etherscan ABI: seize(address _from, uint256 _amount) — no timelock wrapper. DSToken: 'Tokens can be seized from their owner's wallet.'

Sources #

  • GitHub
    https://github.com/securitize-io/dstokenretrieved 2026-04-26
  • Etherscan
    https://etherscan.io/address/0x7712c34205737192402172409a8f7ccef8aa2aecretrieved 2026-04-26

Methodology #

Determine whether a `rescue(…)` or `emergencyWithdraw(…)` function exists callable by admin without a timelock delay on execution.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol blackrock-buidl factor RD-F-041 score not_applicable collected_at 2026-05-12 09:40:42