Oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap
BENQI's assessment for RD-F-073 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
BENQI Liquidity Market uses Chainlink price feeds (not DEX TWAP) via BenqiChainlinkOracle at 0x316aE55EC59e0bEb2121C0e41d4BDef8bF66b32B. Chainlink aggregator-based feeds are not manipulable via DEX liquidity depletion (the standard oracle-manipulation-for-borrow attack vector). Borrow caps exist as a feature (BENQI added them beyond original Compound V2 design). Isolated Markets use a dual oracle system (Chaos Labs Edge + Chainlink secondary) with additional manipulation resistance. F073 red condition (DEX-TWAP oracle with borrow cap > 50% of pool depth) does not apply. Scored green: Chainlink-based oracles structurally resist the oracle-manipulation-profit scenario this factor measures.
Sources #
- URLChaos Labs — BENQI Integrates Chaos Price OraclesChaos Labs BENQI dual oracle integration — Isolated Markets use Chaos Labs Edge + Chainlink secondary for manipulation resistanceretrieved 2026-05-16
- BENQI data cache — oracle feeds (Chainlink confirmed)00-data-cache.json sources.oracle_feeds: 9 Chainlink feeds listed including WBTC/USD, USDC/USD, LINK/USD, ETH/USD, UNI/USD, COMP/USD, BTC/USD; all provider='Chainlink'; heartbeats 86400s or 120s (AVAX/USD); fetched 2026-05-16T10:30:57Zretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the per-asset borrow cap is ≤ (oracle pool depth × manipulation-resistance multiplier).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →