Role separation: upgrade ≠ fee ≠ oracle

BENQI's assessment for RD-F-035 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

Single undisclosed team multisig holds: upgrade authority (_setComptrollerImplementation in Comptroller), fee/reserve role (_setReserveFactor, _reduceTiereserves), and oracle role (_setPriceOracle). BenqiChainlinkOracle also has Set Admin function controlled by the same team. No role separation across upgrade/fee/oracle. This is a structural consequence of the undisclosed monolithic multisig admin.

Sources #

Etherscan
BenqiChainlinkOracle | SnowTraceBenqiChainlinkOracle on Snowtrace — Set Admin function shows single admin controls oracle feed replacementretrieved 2026-05-16
Docs
Core Markets Contracts | BENQIBENQI core markets contracts — single admin controls all Comptroller functions without role separationretrieved 2026-05-16

Methodology #

Determine whether the upgrade role, fee-collection role, and oracle-config role are assigned to distinct addresses.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol benqi factor RD-F-035 score red collected_at 2026-05-16 11:02:12