defirisk.co
rubric v1.7.0

Immutable oracle address

Axelar Network's assessment for RD-F-180 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

[★ CRITICAL-CANDIDATE — PD-017 held] F180 tests whether a lending oracle address is immutable, preventing repricing when an asset depegs. Axelar is a bridge, not a lending protocol. No repricing oracle is used. The auth module address (AxelarAuthWeighted) IS replaceable via governance: InterchainGovernance (7-day delay) relays Cosmos x/gov proposals to EVM; the gateway's authModule can be updated. The F180 failure mode (oracle-address immutability trapping a lending protocol post-depeg) does not apply to bridge architecture. Scored green; flag to orchestrator per PD-017 tracking.

Sources #

  • GitHub
    AxelarGateway.sol authModule parameterAxelarGateway.sol — authModule set in constructor but can be updated via InterchainGovernance relay; no immutable oracle address patternretrieved 2026-05-17
  • Etherscan
    Axelar InterchainGovernance contractInterchainGovernance 0xfDF36A30070ea0241d69052ea85ff44Ad0476a66 — 7-day minimumTimeDelay; governance can update EVM-side parameters including auth moduleretrieved 2026-05-17

Methodology #

Determine whether any collateral oracle address is marked `immutable` in protocol config with no admin-replaceable adapter wrapper, preventing the protocol from repricing when the upstream asset depegs.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol axelar factor RD-F-180 score green collected_at 2026-05-16 21:57:49