Bridge signer-set change proposed/executed
Axelar Network's assessment for RD-F-103 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
T-09 v1 launch signal. Highly applicable: Axelar has two signer-set monitoring surfaces — (1) EVM custom Multisig 0xCC940AE49C78F20E3F13F3cF37e996b98Ac3EC68 (3-of-6 threshold); (2) Cosmos validator set changes on axelar-dojo-1. Multisig last transacted 2026-01-04 (executeContract, not a signer change). Threshold remains 3-of-6. No unscheduled signer change detected. Axelar docs confirm periodic key rotations are a declared scheduled protocol policy — these would be suppressed by the change-management allowlist. Signal would NOT fire today.
Sources #
- EtherscanAxelar Multisig — EtherscanCustom Multisig 0xCC940AE49C78F20E3F13F3cF37e996b98Ac3EC68 — last tx 2026-01-04; threshold 3; no signer change events detectedretrieved 2026-05-17
- Axelar Security Overview — key rotation policyAxelar security model — periodic key rotations declared scheduled policy (suppression applies)retrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Detect whether a bridge validator or signer-set change has been proposed or executed.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →