Fallback behavior on oracle failure
Axelar Network's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No traditional oracle fallback design (no price oracle used). For validator-set failure: if quorum drops below 60% threshold for cross-chain signing, bridge operations halt with no graceful degradation or fallback source. The mintLimiter (3-of-6 Multisig) provides a rate-limit backstop capping per-epoch mints even under partial validator compromise, but this is a damage-limitation measure, not a fallback source for cross-chain verification.
Sources #
- GitHubAxelarGateway.sol mintLimiter implementationAxelarGateway.sol _mintToken() — epoch-based mint cap as partial fallback mitigationretrieved 2026-05-17
- Axelar Network Security DocumentationAxelar security — minimum quorum 0.6 (60%) of consensus weight required for cross-chain operations; below this threshold operations haltretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →