★ Rescue/emergencyWithdraw without timelock
Axelar Network's assessment for RD-F-041 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
AxelarGateway has NO rescue/emergencyWithdraw/sweep function (confirmed from source). InterchainGovernance withdraw() is onlySelf — callable only through internal proposal execution after 7-day timelock. Residual risk 1: Custom Multisig (0xCC94...EC68) withdraw() can send ETH/tokens held by the Multisig contract (3-of-6, no timelock). Residual risk 2: ITS setPauseStatus(bool) callable by single EOA (0x6f24...) without timelock — can immediately halt ITS operations. Not a full TVL-drain function but operationally material.
Sources #
- GitHubInterchainGovernance.sol — axelar-gmp-sdk-solidityInterchainGovernance.sol: withdraw() has onlySelf modifier — callable only via internal executionretrieved 2026-05-17
- AxelarGateway.sol source — GitHubAxelarGateway.sol — no rescue, emergencyWithdraw, or sweep functions foundretrieved 2026-05-17
- InterchainTokenService.sol — GitHub (setPauseStatus)InterchainTokenService.sol: setPauseStatus(bool) accessible via onlyOperatorOrOwner — callable by single EOA owner without timelockretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether a `rescue(…)` or `emergencyWithdraw(…)` function exists callable by admin without a timelock delay on execution.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →