Bridge validator threshold (k-of-M)
Aave v3's assessment for RD-F-149 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
a.DI uses requiredConfirmations per destination chain — the number of bridge adapters that must independently deliver a message before execution. Documentation recommends >2. Specific per-chain requiredConfirmations values not confirmed from public sources. If any chain uses confirmations=1, governance messages to that chain could be forged by a single compromised adapter. If confirmations ≥ 2 for all chains, this is a strong positive (multi-bridge threshold). On-chain read of CrossChainController.getConfigsByChain() or equivalent required.
Sources #
- Docsa.DI documentation — requiredConfirmationsa.DI overview — requiredConfirmations recommendation >2retrieved 2026-04-27
- BGD: a.DI - Aave Delivery Infrastructure forum postBGD a.DI governance forum introductionretrieved 2026-04-27
Methodology #
Read the signature threshold required to approve a cross-chain message (for non-LZ bridges).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →