Circuit breaker on price deviation
Aave v3's assessment for RD-F-057 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No protocol-level circuit breaker exists in the Pool contract that halts borrowing or liquidations on oracle price deviation. CAPO operates at the oracle-adapter level (not Pool level). The March 2026 CAPO/wstETH incident directly demonstrates the gap: the CAPO exchange rate cap was misconfigured below market rate, triggering approximately $27M in E-Mode liquidations. No Pool-level mechanism caught this before liquidations fired. Post-incident governance only restored borrow caps, no architectural circuit breaker was added. Red-within-category (does not elevate Cat 3 to red roll-up per T-10 methodology — Cat 3 remains yellow).
Sources #
- URLDirect to AIP: Re-enable wstETH Borrow Caps Post CAPO IncidentAIP: Re-enable wstETH Borrow Caps Post CAPO Incident — no circuit breaker addedretrieved 2026-04-27
- aave-v3-origin (v3.6.0) Pool sourceaave-v3-origin Pool.sol — no deviation circuit breaker in Pool contractretrieved 2026-04-27
Methodology #
Determine whether the protocol halts or reverts if the oracle-reported price deviates by more than X% from a reference within Y blocks.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →