Venus Protocol + Blizz Finance (two protocols, one event): Oracle Min-Price Floor Exploit (Stale Price Feed During Depeg)
When LUNA's price hit zero, Chainlink's hardcoded $0.10 minimum floor let attackers borrow $21.8M from Venus and Blizz using worthless LUNA as collateral — and Blizz's own timelock safety feature prevented it from responding in time to stop the drain.
Summary #
Venus Protocol + Blizz Finance (two protocols, one event) suffered a Lending Protocol (both) on 2022-05-12, resulting in a loss of approximately $14M.
What happened #
When LUNA's price hit zero, Chainlink's hardcoded $0.10 minimum floor let attackers borrow $21.8M from Venus and Blizz using worthless LUNA as collateral — and Blizz's own timelock safety feature prevented it from responding in time to stop the drain.
Linked factors #
- RD-F-077 — related : Auto-linked by C.4 triage 2026-05-07
- RD-F-099 — illustrative : Oracle price deviation > X% from secondary source — RT signal would have fired [via realtime_signals/Oracle anomaly: Y — this IS the exploit; oracle price diverging massively from market price is the core signal]
- RD-F-101 — illustrative : Large governance proposal queued — RT signal would have fired [via realtime_signals/Governance/admin action: Y (attempted) — Venus suspended activity; Blizz attempted but timelock prevented timely action]
- RD-F-126 — related : Is-a-fork-of (Cat 8 anchor) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Forked?: Y — Venus forked from Compound; Blizz forked from Aave]
- RD-F-127 — illustrative : Upstream Compound has patches that may not be merged here [via dashboard_risk_factors/Forked?: Y — Venus forked from Compound; Blizz forked from Aave]