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rubric v1.7.0

Market-listing governance threshold

A economic risk factor in the v1.7.0 rubric. Measured per protocol on a s cadence.

Methodology how we score#

What this measures
This factor is a categorical assessment of the protocol's market-listing governance threshold: permissionless (any address can create markets), low-threshold (governance vote required but with low quorum or short timelock), high-threshold (governance vote with meaningful quorum and timelock), or no new listings (protocol does not add new markets). The classification is derived from source code inspection and governance configuration. This factor applies to lending protocols and permissionless vaults.

Why it matters
The ability of any address to list new markets or vaults without human review is a direct enabler of injection attacks. AlexLab II ($16.18M, 2025) was exploited when an attacker self-listed a malicious token through the protocol's permissionless vault mechanism. Cork Protocol ($12M, 2025) lost funds because its CorkHook contract accepted unvalidated external contracts as legitimate inputs. Penpie ($27M, 2024) and Pickle Finance ($19.7M, 2020) share the same root cause: permissionless registration paths that allowed fake markets or jars to be created without whitelist review. The severity of this factor is amplified when the protocol is also a Compound V2 fork (where permissionless market creation enables the empty-market inflation attack).

Green / Yellow / Red
Green: no new market listings permitted (fixed market set), or new listings require a high-threshold governance vote with at least forty-eight hours of timelock and multisig countersignature. Yellow: new listings require a governance vote but with a low quorum threshold or less than forty-eight hours of timelock, creating an exploitable activation window. Red: any address can create markets, vaults, or pools without governance approval or whitelist review.

Common gray cases
Protocols that allow permissionless creation of isolated markets with limited collateral sharing may present lower risk than fully-shared-liquidity permissionless designs; curator must assess the isolation boundary when scoring.

Notable historical examples
- Penpie ($27M, 2024): Permissionless market registration allowed attacker to create a fake market and exploit the protocol.
- Sonne Finance ($20M, 2024): Permissionless governance execution enabled front-running of market activation.
- Pickle Finance ($19.7M, 2020): Permissionless jar creation without whitelist review.
- AlexLab ($16.18M, 2025): Permissionless vault token self-listing used to inject malicious asset.
- Cork Protocol ($12M, 2025): Permissionless contract registration without validation of submitted contract code.
- Radiant Capital 1st ($4.5M, 2024): Governance-activated market with 6-second exploitation window.
- Onyx Protocol ($2.1M, 2023): Governance-added PEPE market with no seed deposit.

Measurement what to look for#

Classify the governance threshold required to list a new market as: permissionless / low-threshold (team multisig) / high-threshold (DAO vote) / no new listings.

Data & output #

Data source
Governance contract source + protocol docs on market listing process
Output format
Green / Yellow / Red
Evidence artifact
Classification string + evidence URL
Confidence signal
green = high-threshold (full DAO vote required); yellow = low-threshold (team multisig); red = permissionless (anyone can list); gray = protocol does not support new market listings

Scored protocols 0 carry this factor#

No protocols have been scored for this factor yet.

Linked hacks 7 historical incidents#

causalAlexLab (Bitcoin DeFi / Stacks): Vault permission hijack via malicious token self-listing; `as-contract` context abuse2025-06-06 · $16M · Vault permission hijack via malicious token self-listing; `as-contract` context abuse · Market-listing governance threshold = permissionless [via cross-hack: Factor 7: Permissionless Feature Without Safety Validation]
causalCork Protocol: Fake token injection → exchange rate manipulation via unvalidated CorkHook input2025-05-28 · $12M · Fake token injection → exchange rate manipulation via unvalidated CorkHook input · Market-listing governance threshold = permissionless [via cross-hack: Factor 7: Permissionless Feature Without Safety Validation]
causalPenpie: Reentrancy via fake Pendle market → staking balance inflation → excess reward drain2024-09-03 · $27M · Reentrancy via fake Pendle market → staking balance inflation → excess reward drain · Market-listing governance threshold = permissionless [via cross-hack: Factor 7: Permissionless Feature Without Safety Validation]
causalSonne Finance: Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — permissionless governance execution + exchange rate manipulation2024-05-14 · $20M · Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — permissionless governance execution + exchange rate manipulation · Market-listing governance threshold = permissionless [via cross-hack: Factor 7: Permissionless Feature Without Safety Validation]
causalRadiant Capital (1st incident): Compound V2 / Aave V2 empty-market rounding error — new USDC market with totalSupply = 02024-01-02 · $5M · Compound V2 / Aave V2 empty-market rounding error — new USDC market with totalSupply = 0 · Market-listing governance threshold = permissionless [via cross-hack: Factor 7: Permissionless Feature Without Safety Validation]
causalOnyx Protocol: Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — governance-added PEPE market exploited via rounding + exchange rate inflation2023-10-31 · $2M · Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — governance-added PEPE market exploited via rounding + exchange rate inflation · Market-listing governance threshold = permissionless [via cross-hack: Factor 7: Permissionless Feature Without Safety Validation]
causalPickle Finance: Fake jar injection — missing whitelist in Controller's jar-swap function2020-11-22 · $20M · Fake jar injection — missing whitelist in Controller's jar-swap function · Market-listing governance threshold = permissionless [via cross-hack: Factor 7: Permissionless Feature Without Safety Validation]
rubric_version v1.7.0factor RD-F-072category 4carried 0critical no