Measure the number of days between the audit report sign-off date and the mainnet deploy of the audited bytecode.
No protocols have been scored for this factor yet.
causalKelp DAO (rsETH liquid restaking): Forged cross-chain message via LayerZero EndpointV2 lzReceive — exploitation of 1/1 DVN (single-validator) configuration2026-04-18 · $292M · Forged cross-chain message via LayerZero EndpointV2 lzReceive — exploitation of 1/1 DVN (single-validator) configuration · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — the 1/1 DVN configuration had been in place at least since Jan 2025 (when flagged); this was a long-latent misconfiguration, not a new d...] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — the 1/1 DVN configuration had been in place at least since Jan 2025 (when flagged); this was a long-latent misconfiguration, not a new d...]→
causalHyperbridge (Polkadot-native interoperability rollup built by Polytope Labs; Token Gateway / HandlerV1): Smart-contract proof-verification bypass — MMR bounds-check failure + missing proof-to-request binding + zero challenge period + single-step admin transfer2026-04-13 · $3M · Smart-contract proof-verification bypass — MMR bounds-check failure + missing proof-to-request binding + zero challenge period + single-step admin transfer · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — the HandlerV1 design flaws were longstanding, not from a recent upgrade] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — the HandlerV1 design flaws were longstanding, not from a recent upgrade]→
causalDango (custom-L1 perpetual DEX; Grug engine on Tendermint): Missing sign/positivity check on `donate()` input in the insurance-fund contract — negative value reversed accounting direction2026-04-13 · $2M · Missing sign/positivity check on `donate()` input in the insurance-fund contract — negative value reversed accounting direction · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — perps contract live ~90 days at exploit (since Alpha Mainnet)] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — perps contract live ~90 days at exploit (since Alpha Mainnet)]→
causalSilo Finance (V2, soUSDC managed vault on Arbitrum): Immutable hardcoded wstUSR oracle (pricing depegged asset ~10x reality) + supply-cap bypass via `receiver` parameter + `totalAssets()` summing externally-donated shares2026-04-03 · $392K · Immutable hardcoded wstUSR oracle (pricing depegged asset ~10x reality) + supply-cap bypass via `receiver` parameter + `totalAssets()` summing externally-donated shares · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — V2 managed-vault architecture ~12 months old; wstUSR market configuration newer] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — V2 managed-vault architecture ~12 months old; wstUSR market configuration newer]→
causalDrift Protocol (Solana perpetual futures DEX): Multi-month social engineering + Solana durable-nonce pre-signing + fake-collateral-token / attacker-controlled oracle2026-04-01 · $285M · Multi-month social engineering + Solana durable-nonce pre-signing + fake-collateral-token / attacker-controlled oracle · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Security Council migrated to 2/5 threshold with zero timelock approximately 6 days before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Security Council migrated to 2/5 threshold with zero timelock approximately 6 days before exploit]→
causalSolv Protocol (BRO vault): ERC-3525 Callback Reentrancy — Double Mint (onERC721Received fires before state update)2026-03-05 · $3M · ERC-3525 Callback Reentrancy — Double Mint (onERC721Received fires before state update) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — BRO vault was a newer product added after main audits] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — BRO vault was a newer product added after main audits]→
causalMoonwell: Oracle Misconfiguration (Missing ETH/USD Multiplier)2026-02-15 · $2M · Oracle Misconfiguration (Missing ETH/USD Multiplier) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — Chainlink OEV oracle wrappers newly deployed via MIP-X43]→
causalMakina Finance: Permissionless share price oracle update (updateTotalAum) + flash loan Curve pool manipulation → share price inflation → LP drain2026-01-20 · $4M · Permissionless share price oracle update (updateTotalAum) + flash loan Curve pool manipulation → share price inflation → LP drain · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Dialectic's DUSD/USDC Curve pool integration deployed post-audit in late October 2025; exploit occurred 6 weeks after deployment] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
causalAevo (formerly Ribbon Finance): Proxy upgrade removed oracle access control — oracle price settable to arbitrary value → vault fully drained in atomic loop2025-12-12 · $3M · Proxy upgrade removed oracle access control — oracle price settable to arbitrary value → vault fully drained in atomic loop · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — oracle upgrade deployed 6 days before exploit]→
causalUSPD: CPIMP (Clandestine Proxy In the Middle of Proxy) — front-run proxy initialization, shadow admin installation, 78-day dormancy, then mint + drain2025-12-04 · $1M · CPIMP (Clandestine Proxy In the Middle of Proxy) — front-run proxy initialization, shadow admin installation, 78-day dormancy, then mint + drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — proxy deployment (the deployment event itself was the vulnerability)] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — proxy deployment (the deployment event itself was the vulnerability)]→
causalGANA Payment: Leaked Owner Key + EIP-7702 Delegator Contract (onlyEOA Bypass)2025-11-20 · $3M · Leaked Owner Key + EIP-7702 Delegator Contract (onlyEOA Bypass) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — entire protocol was 9 days old; all code was newly deployed] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — entire protocol was 9 days old; all code was newly deployed]→
causalNew Gold Protocol (NGP): Flash loan + spot price oracle manipulation + broken transfer logic (dead address bypass of buy limits)2025-09-17 · $2M · Flash loan + spot price oracle manipulation + broken transfer logic (dead address bypass of buy limits) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — all code freshly deployed] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — all code freshly deployed]→
causalBunni: Precision/Rounding Error in Custom Liquidity Distribution Function (LDF)2025-09-01 · $8M · Precision/Rounding Error in Custom Liquidity Distribution Function (LDF) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — codebase continuously evolving; changes made during and after multiple audit windows]→
causalCredix: Admin Privilege Abuse — Bridge Role Minting Unbacked Collateral2025-08-05 · $5M · Admin Privilege Abuse — Bridge Role Minting Unbacked Collateral · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Unknown — Credix was new to Sonic chain; deployment recency unconfirmed] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Unknown — Credix was new to Sonic chain; deployment recency unconfirmed]→
relatedGMX V1: Cross-Contract Reentrancy via Order-Keeper Callback2025-07-09 · Cross-Contract Reentrancy via Order-Keeper Callback · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: No new deployment — but code significantly changed since last audit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: No new deployment — but code significantly changed since last audit] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract] || (+1 more matches)→
causalResupplyFi: ERC4626 Donation Attack (Vault Inflation / Zero Exchange Rate)2025-06-25 · $10M · ERC4626 Donation Attack (Vault Inflation / Zero Exchange Rate) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — wstUSR market contract deployed ~2 hours before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — wstUSR market contract deployed ~2 hours before exploit]→
causalHacken ($HAI token): Bridge private key leak from decommissioned server → unauthorized token minting → dump2025-06-20 · $170K · Bridge private key leak from decommissioned server → unauthorized token minting → dump · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — bridge architectural migration in progress at time of incident; old server credentials not rotated] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — bridge architectural migration in progress at time of incident; old server credentials not rotated]→
causalCork Protocol: Fake token injection → exchange rate manipulation via unvalidated CorkHook input2025-05-28 · $12M · Fake token injection → exchange rate manipulation via unvalidated CorkHook input · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Unknown — CorkHook appears to have been a core component not covered by audits rather than a new deployment] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Unknown — CorkHook appears to have been a core component not covered by audits rather than a new deployment]→
causalMobiusDAO: Decimal handling double-multiplication bug in minting function — pennies-to-quadrillions inflation2025-05-11 · $2M · Decimal handling double-multiplication bug in minting function — pennies-to-quadrillions inflation · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — all code freshly deployed; 3 days old] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — all code freshly deployed; 3 days old] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
causalLNDFi (LND.fi): Admin Backdoor (Malicious Code Injection by Contractor / DPRK Dev)2025-05-09 · $1M · Admin Backdoor (Malicious Code Injection by Contractor / DPRK Dev) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — fresh deployment with injected backdoor]→
causalLoopscale (formerly Bridgesplit): Oracle Price Manipulation (RateX PT Token Pricing)2025-04-26 · $6M · Oracle Price Manipulation (RateX PT Token Pricing) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — recently launched (16 days); new RateX PT pricing logic]→
causalAbracadabra Money: Logic bug — phantom collateral / post-liquidation state inconsistency2025-03-25 · $13M · Logic bug — phantom collateral / post-liquidation state inconsistency · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Y — gmCauldron integration with GMX was a relatively new module] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Y — gmCauldron integration with GMX was a relatively new module]→
causalZoth (RWA yield protocol): Admin key compromise → malicious proxy contract upgrade → vault drain2025-03-21 · $8M · Admin key compromise → malicious proxy contract upgrade → vault drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the attacker deployed a malicious implementation contract and upgraded the proxy to it immediately before the drain] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the attacker deployed a malicious implementation contract and upgraded the proxy to it immediately before the drain]→
causalInfini (Crypto Neobank): Retained Admin Privileges — Rogue Developer Backdoor2025-02-24 · $50M · Retained Admin Privileges — Rogue Developer Backdoor · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: No (contract deployed 114 days prior)] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: No (contract deployed 114 days prior)]→
causalByBit: Frontend Spoofing / Blind Signing — Malicious Safe Multisig Implementation Upgrade2025-02-21 · $1.4B · Frontend Spoofing / Blind Signing — Malicious Safe Multisig Implementation Upgrade · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — attacker deployed and installed malicious Safe implementation contract]→
causalzkLend: Empty market accumulator inflation via flash loan donation mechanism + rounding error → collateral inflation → drain2025-02-11 · $10M · Empty market accumulator inflation via flash loan donation mechanism + rounding error → collateral inflation → drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Partially — wstETH market was newly added to Starknet; the combination of new empty market + existing accumulator logic created the exploit ...] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Partially — wstETH market was newly added to Starknet; the combination of new empty market + existing accumulator logic created the exploit ...]→
causalClober DEX: Reentrancy (Post-Audit Code Change)2024-12-10 · $500K · Reentrancy (Post-Audit Code Change) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — post-audit code change added the vulnerable `burnHook` callback]→
causalPolter Finance: Spot price oracle manipulation (SpookySwap V2/V3) → inflated BOO collateral → draining borrow2024-11-16 · $9M · Spot price oracle manipulation (SpookySwap V2/V3) → inflated BOO collateral → draining borrow · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — BOO market was a new addition] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — BOO market was a new addition] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
causalRadiant Capital: Compromised multisig private keys → malicious contract upgrade → pool ownership transfer → drain2024-10-16 · $53M · Compromised multisig private keys → malicious contract upgrade → pool ownership transfer → drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — malicious upgrade was the attack vector; but the underlying contract's upgrade mechanism was a design feature] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — malicious upgrade was the attack vector; but the underlying contract's upgrade mechanism was a design feature]→
causalOnyx Protocol (2nd incident): Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — VUSD governance-added market2024-09-25 · $4M · Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — VUSD governance-added market · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — VUSD market newly added via governance]→
causalBedrock (uniBTC vault): Unregistered NATIVE_BTC in SigmaSupplier → disabled supply cap → ETH-to-BTC 1:1 minting (infinite mint)2024-09-25 · $2M · Unregistered NATIVE_BTC in SigmaSupplier → disabled supply cap → ETH-to-BTC 1:1 minting (infinite mint) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — uniBTC vault was a recently deployed/upgraded contract that was not audited] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 21: Post-Audit Code Change Without Re-Audit]→
causalGriffin AI ($GAIN token): Fake LayerZero Peer Initialization (Cross-Chain Minting Exploit)2024-09-24 · $3M · Fake LayerZero Peer Initialization (Cross-Chain Minting Exploit) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — brand new token launch]→
causalShezmu: Unrestricted Collateral Minting in CDP Vault2024-09-20 · $5M · Unrestricted Collateral Minting in CDP Vault · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — contract upgrade 17 days before exploit (may be related)] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — contract upgrade 17 days before exploit (may be related)]→
causalPenpie: Reentrancy via fake Pendle market → staking balance inflation → excess reward drain2024-09-03 · $27M · Reentrancy via fake Pendle market → staking balance inflation → excess reward drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Likely Y — the `batchHarvestMarketRewards()` function appears to be a later addition] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Likely Y — the `batchHarvestMarketRewards()` function appears to be a later addition] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract] || (+1 more matches)→
causalRonin Network (Bridge): Uninitialized Variable in Contract Upgrade (initializeV3 Skipped)2024-08-06 · $12M · Uninitialized Variable in Contract Upgrade (initializeV3 Skipped) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — bridge upgrade deployed 6 days before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — bridge upgrade deployed 6 days before exploit]→
causalAstroport (on Terra Phoenix chain): IBC hooks reentrancy — reintroduced known vulnerability in June upgrade after April patch; timeout callback re-enters token minting2024-07-30 · $6M · IBC hooks reentrancy — reintroduced known vulnerability in June upgrade after April patch; timeout callback re-enters token minting · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — June Terra chain upgrade accidentally reintroduced vulnerability]→
causalRho Market: Oracle misconfiguration (deployment error) → MEV bot price manipulation → USDC/USDT drain2024-07-19 · Oracle misconfiguration (deployment error) → MEV bot price manipulation → USDC/USDT drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — newly deployed oracle configuration contained the error] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — newly deployed oracle configuration contained the error]→
causalLiFi Protocol (Jumper Exchange): Call Injection via Unvalidated Swap Function2024-07-16 · $10M · Call Injection via Unvalidated Swap Function · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — new facet deployed July 11, 5 days before exploit]→
causalAlexLab (XLink Bridge): Phishing-compromised deployer private key → malicious proxy upgrades → vault drain2024-05-14 · $4M · Phishing-compromised deployer private key → malicious proxy upgrades → vault drain · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — attacker deployed malicious upgrades during the attack]→
causalSonne Finance: Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — permissionless governance execution + exchange rate manipulation2024-05-14 · $20M · Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — permissionless governance execution + exchange rate manipulation · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — New VELO market was being activated; the vulnerability existed in the base Compound V2 fork code activated by the new market] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — New VELO market was being activated; the vulnerability existed in the base Compound V2 fork code activated by the new market]→
causalPike Finance: Storage Layout Collision → Unauthorized Proxy Upgrade / Ownership Takeover2024-04-26 · $2M · Storage Layout Collision → Unauthorized Proxy Upgrade / Ownership Takeover · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — emergency patch deployed after first exploit]→
causalHedgey Finance: Unverified User Input — Flash Loan Enabled Approval Manipulation2024-04-19 · $45M · Unverified User Input — Flash Loan Enabled Approval Manipulation · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — post-audit contract version] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — post-audit contract version] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 21: Post-Audit Code Change Without Re-Audit]→
causalGrand Base: Deployer wallet private key leak → unauthorized token minting → dump2024-04-15 · $2M · Deployer wallet private key leak → unauthorized token minting → dump · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — token contract had existing minting rights; no new deployment] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — token contract had existing minting rights; no new deployment]→
causalPrismaFi: Flash Loan + Missing Input Validation (Migration Helper)2024-03-28 · $12M · Flash Loan + Missing Input Validation (Migration Helper) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — MigrateTroveZap contract deployed within the week before the attack] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — MigrateTroveZap contract deployed within the week before the attack]→
causalMunchables: Malicious Insider — Storage Slot Manipulation via Upgradeable Proxy2024-03-26 · $63M · Malicious Insider — Storage Slot Manipulation via Upgradeable Proxy · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — Blast L2 new deployment; proxy upgraded to unverified implementation]→
causalUnizen: Unvalidated external call in upgraded DEX Aggregation contract — approval drain2024-03-08 · $2M · Unvalidated external call in upgraded DEX Aggregation contract — approval drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — gas optimization upgrade deployed immediately before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — gas optimization upgrade deployed immediately before exploit]→
causalWooFi (WooPPV2): Flash loan → WOO oracle price manipulation → pool swap drain2024-03-05 · $9M · Flash loan → WOO oracle price manipulation → pool swap drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — the core WooPPV2 contract predates the exploit; the new risk factor was the newly added WOO lending market which changed the economic at...] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — the core WooPPV2 contract predates the exploit; the new risk factor was the newly added WOO lending market which changed the economic at...]→
causalSeneca Protocol: Approval Exploit — Arbitrary transferFrom via Constructed Calldata2024-02-28 · $6M · Approval Exploit — Arbitrary transferFrom via Constructed Calldata · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — core Chamber contract; no recent upgrade] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — core Chamber contract; no recent upgrade]→
causalIonic Money (formerly Midas): Fake Collateral Listing (Social Engineering → On-chain Exploit)2024-02-04 · $7M · Fake Collateral Listing (Social Engineering → On-chain Exploit) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: New collateral listing (governance/admin action)]→
causalSocket (Bungee Bridge): Unvalidated user input in new route — transferFrom injection via approval drain2024-01-16 · $3M · Unvalidated user input in new route — transferFrom injection via approval drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Vulnerable route added 3 days before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Vulnerable route added 3 days before exploit]→
causalRadiant Capital (1st incident): Compound V2 / Aave V2 empty-market rounding error — new USDC market with totalSupply = 02024-01-02 · $5M · Compound V2 / Aave V2 empty-market rounding error — new USDC market with totalSupply = 0 · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — new USDC market activated via governance]→
causalOKX DEX (OKX Decentralized Exchange Aggregator): Compromised proxy admin key → malicious implementation upgrade → claimTokens() drain of user approvals2023-12-13 · $3M · Compromised proxy admin key → malicious implementation upgrade → claimTokens() drain of user approvals · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — malicious upgrade deployed by attacker] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — malicious upgrade deployed by attacker]→
causalYearn Finance (yETH LST stableswap pool + yETH-WETH Curve pool): Invariant corruption via remove_liquidity(0) + update_rates() calls → Newton-Raphson arithmetic underflow → 235 trillion yETH minted from dust deposit → single-asset drain2023-11-30 · $9M · Invariant corruption via remove_liquidity(0) + update_rates() calls → Newton-Raphson arithmetic underflow → 235 trillion yETH minted from dust deposit → single-asset drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — abandoned legacy code, no recent changes] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — abandoned legacy code, no recent changes]→
causalOnyx Protocol: Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — governance-added PEPE market exploited via rounding + exchange rate inflation2023-10-31 · $2M · Compound V2 empty-market donation attack — governance-added PEPE market exploited via rounding + exchange rate inflation · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Proposal 22 added the PEPE market days before the exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Proposal 22 added the PEPE market days before the exploit]→
causalUnibot: Unvalidated arbitrary call in new router — transferFrom injection via approval drain2023-10-31 · $640K · Unvalidated arbitrary call in new router — transferFrom injection via approval drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — new router deployed 3 days before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — new router deployed 3 days before exploit]→
relatedPlatypus Finance (3rd exploit): Flash loan + LP-AVAX pool cash/liability manipulation → slippage-inflated swap output2023-10-12 · $2M · Flash loan + LP-AVAX pool cash/liability manipulation → slippage-inflated swap output · Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 21: Post-Audit Code Change Without Re-Audit]→
causalStars Arena: Reentrancy2023-10-07 · $3M · Reentrancy · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — second exploit used contract deployed as "fix" for first exploit, hours before attack] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — second exploit used contract deployed as "fix" for first exploit, hours before attack]→
causalHypr Network: Bridge Contract Reinitialization (OP Stack Unpatched Dev Branch)2023-09-12 · $220K · Bridge Contract Reinitialization (OP Stack Unpatched Dev Branch) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — newly launched L2 bridge, 2 days old]→
causalExactly Protocol: Unvalidated market address in periphery — fake market injection → _msgSender hijack → collateral drain + reentrancy2023-08-18 · $7M · Unvalidated market address in periphery — fake market injection → _msgSender hijack → collateral drain + reentrancy · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — DebtManager was a new periphery feature added without undergoing an audit first] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — DebtManager was a new periphery feature added without undergoing an audit first]→
causalRocketSwap: Bruteforced server private keys → farming contract drain via proxy admin + high-risk permissions2023-08-14 · $869K · Bruteforced server private keys → farming contract drain via proxy admin + high-risk permissions · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — farming contracts were newly deployed on Base] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — farming contracts were newly deployed on Base]→
causalZunami Protocol: Flash loan + SDT token swap → totalHoldings price calculation manipulation → zETH/UZD LP price manipulation → drain2023-08-13 · $2M · Flash loan + SDT token swap → totalHoldings price calculation manipulation → zETH/UZD LP price manipulation → drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — MimCurveStakeDAO strategy was added after the primary audit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — MimCurveStakeDAO strategy was added after the primary audit]→
causalSteadefi: Compromised Deployer Key → Ownership Transfer2023-08-07 · $1M · Compromised Deployer Key → Ownership Transfer · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — standard vault ownership pattern exploited; no recent upgrade] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — standard vault ownership pattern exploited; no recent upgrade]→
causalKannagi Finance: Insider rug — privileged admin withdrawal on behalf of users (MainChef address)2023-07-29 · $1M · Insider rug — privileged admin withdrawal on behalf of users (MainChef address) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — newly launched]→
causalDeFiLabs: Backdoor Function in Staking Contract (Insider Rug Pull)2023-07-27 · $2M · Backdoor Function in Staking Contract (Insider Rug Pull) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — vPoolv6 was a new contract version, deployed and actively used but never audited] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — vPoolv6 was a new contract version, deployed and actively used but never audited]→
causalEraLend (formerly Nexon Finance): Read-Only Reentrancy (SyncSwap LP Callback — Stale Reserves Oracle)2023-07-25 · $3M · Read-Only Reentrancy (SyncSwap LP Callback — Stale Reserves Oracle) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Unknown — recent zkSync Era launch] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Unknown — recent zkSync Era launch]→
causalConic Finance: Read-only reentrancy in CurveLPOracleV2 (ETH/WETH mismatch bypassed reentrancy guard) + sandwich attack on imbalanced pool2023-07-21 · $4M · Read-only reentrancy in CurveLPOracleV2 (ETH/WETH mismatch bypassed reentrancy guard) + sandwich attack on imbalanced pool · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — CurveLPOracleV2 was a new contract deployed shortly before the hack]→
causalAtlantis Loans: Governance attack on abandoned protocol — attacker passed malicious proposal granting token contract control, then upgraded to drain addresses with active approvals2023-06-10 · $3M · Governance attack on abandoned protocol — attacker passed malicious proposal granting token contract control, then upgraded to drain addresses with active approvals · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — attacker deployed malicious upgrade post-governance takeover]→
causalJimbo's Protocol: Flash loan + missing slippage control in rebalancing function → liquidity drain2023-05-28 · $8M · Flash loan + missing slippage control in rebalancing function → liquidity drain · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — v2 launched 3 days prior; v1 had already collapsed] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
causalSwaprum: Rug Pull via Malicious Contract Upgrade2023-05-18 · $3M · Rug Pull via Malicious Contract Upgrade · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — malicious upgrade deployed immediately before drain] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — malicious upgrade deployed immediately before drain]→
causalDeus DAO / DEI stablecoin: Mis-ordered Parameters in burnFrom — Public Approval Override2023-05-06 · $7M · Mis-ordered Parameters in burnFrom — Public Approval Override · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the vulnerable burnFrom function was introduced in an upgrade approximately 1 month before the exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the vulnerable burnFrom function was introduced in an upgrade approximately 1 month before the exploit] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
causalLevel Finance: Logic bug — referral reward claimMultiple() epoch not checked for reuse2023-05-01 · $1M · Logic bug — referral reward claimMultiple() epoch not checked for reuse · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — vulnerable code introduced via proxy upgrade on April 18, 2023] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 21: Post-Audit Code Change Without Re-Audit]→
causalMerlin DEX: Insider rug — max approval drain via privileged Feeto address2023-04-25 · $2M · Insider rug — max approval drain via privileged Feeto address · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — pools deployed fresh for the LGE] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — pools deployed fresh for the LGE]→
causalSushiSwap: Malicious Callback / Arbitrary Approval Drain2023-04-08 · $3M · Malicious Callback / Arbitrary Approval Drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — RouteProcessor2 was 4 days old at time of exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — RouteProcessor2 was 4 days old at time of exploit]→
causalSafemoon: Upgrade introduced public burn() function → LP token burn → pool price manipulation → BNB drain2023-03-28 · $9M · Upgrade introduced public burn() function → LP token burn → pool price manipulation → BNB drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the vulnerability was introduced by the upgrade deployed 6 hours before the attack] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the vulnerability was introduced by the upgrade deployed 6 hours before the attack] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 21: Post-Audit Code Change Without Re-Audit]→
causalKokomo Finance: Insider rug — deployer upgraded implementation to malicious contract → drained WBTC deposits2023-03-26 · $4M · Insider rug — deployer upgraded implementation to malicious contract → drained WBTC deposits · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — newly launched; malicious implementation deployed as part of the attack] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
relatedEuler Finance: Donation Function Bypassing Health Check (Logic Bug in EIP-14 upgrade)2023-03-13 · $197M · Donation Function Bypassing Health Check (Logic Bug in EIP-14 upgrade) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded (Y/N + detail): YES** — The vulnerability was introduced in EIP-14 (the `donateToReserves` function), deployed as an upgrade prior to the hack. Not in the o...] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded (Y/N + detail): YES** — The vulnerability was introduced in EIP-14 (the `donateToReserves` function), deployed as an upgrade prior to the hack. Not in the o...]→
causalHedera (Network-level — Hashgraph Smart Contract Service): Smart Contract Service (HTS) Code Bug — Uniswap V2 Port Exploit2023-03-09 · $515K · Smart Contract Service (HTS) Code Bug — Uniswap V2 Port Exploit · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: The Uniswap V2 ports to HTS were relatively new]→
causalHope Finance: Insider Exit Scam — Malicious Fake Router Pre-Deployed2023-02-20 · $2M · Insider Exit Scam — Malicious Fake Router Pre-Deployed · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — fresh launch deployment] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — fresh launch deployment]→
causalDexible: Unvalidated router — selfSwap() transferFrom injection via approval drain2023-02-17 · $2M · Unvalidated router — selfSwap() transferFrom injection via approval drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — v2 contracts introduced the selfSwap() function days before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — v2 contracts introduced the selfSwap() function days before exploit]→
causalPlatypus Finance: Flash loan + emergencyWithdraw() solvency check bypass — collateral withdrawal without repaying borrowed USP2023-02-16 · $9M · Flash loan + emergencyWithdraw() solvency check bypass — collateral withdrawal without repaying borrowed USP · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — USP stablecoin and associated collateral contracts newly launched]→
causalBonqDAO: Oracle Manipulation (Tellor Price Feed — Instant Value)2023-02-01 · $120M · Oracle Manipulation (Tellor Price Feed — Instant Value) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — oracle contracts were post-audit additions]→
causalMidas Capital: Read-only reentrancy on Curve LP token virtual price — inflated collateral valuation2023-01-15 · $660K · Read-only reentrancy on Curve LP token virtual price — inflated collateral valuation · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — newly added collateral type (WMATIC-stMATIC Curve LP) enabled shortly before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — newly added collateral type (WMATIC-stMATIC Curve LP) enabled shortly before exploit]→
causalAnkr (aBNBc) + Helio Money (HAY stablecoin): Deployer private key compromise → malicious aBNBc contract upgrade → permissionless infinite mint → PancakeSwap pool drain + Helio collateral collapse2022-12-02 · $5M · Deployer private key compromise → malicious aBNBc contract upgrade → permissionless infinite mint → PancakeSwap pool drain + Helio collateral collapse · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — malicious upgrade was deployed during the attack]→
causalTeam Finance: Flawed migrate() function — Uniswap V2→V3 migration with skewed price manipulation2022-10-27 · $16M · Flawed migrate() function — Uniswap V2→V3 migration with skewed price manipulation · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — The V2→V3 migration feature was a relatively recent addition] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — The V2→V3 migration feature was a relatively recent addition]→
causalTempleDAO / STAX Finance: Missing access control in migrateStake() — unvalidated oldStaking parameter2022-10-11 · $2M · Missing access control in migrateStake() — unvalidated oldStaking parameter · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — STAX was a newer application layer built atop TempleDAO, deployed June 2022] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — STAX was a newer application layer built atop TempleDAO, deployed June 2022]→
causalAcala Network: Misconfiguration of iBTC/aUSD liquidity pool — incorrect parameter in newly launched pool triggered unbounded aUSD minting2022-08-14 · $2M · Misconfiguration of iBTC/aUSD liquidity pool — incorrect parameter in newly launched pool triggered unbounded aUSD minting · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — iBTC/aUSD pool launched same day as exploit]→
causalNomad Bridge: Initialisation Error — Zero-Address Trusted Root (Merkle Proof Bypass)2022-08-02 · $190M · Initialisation Error — Zero-Address Trusted Root (Merkle Proof Bypass) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — Replica contract upgraded June 2022]→
causalNirvana Finance: Flash Loan + AMM Price Manipulation (Treasury Drain)2022-07-28 · $4M · Flash Loan + AMM Price Manipulation (Treasury Drain) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — recently launched]→
causalGym Network (GymNet): Missing caller verification — fake deposits via unchecked balance inflation → withdraw drain2022-06-10 · $2M · Missing caller verification — fake deposits via unchecked balance inflation → withdraw drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — new Single Pool Contract with Claim and Pool feature deployed 2 days before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — new Single Pool Contract with Claim and Pool feature deployed 2 days before exploit]→
causalFei Protocol / Rari Capital (Fuse): Re-entrancy via `exitMarket()` in Compound fork missing check-effects-interaction pattern2022-04-30 · $80M · Re-entrancy via `exitMarket()` in Compound fork missing check-effects-interaction pattern · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the March 2022 partial patch modified CToken and Comptroller but left `exitMarket()` uncovered] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the March 2022 partial patch modified CToken and Comptroller but left `exitMarket()` uncovered]→
causalDeus DAO: Dual oracle manipulation — VWAP oracle pre-poisoned via flash swap, then on-chain AMM oracle manipulated via flash loan — to inflate DEI collateral value and borrow far beyond real collateral worth2022-04-28 · $13M · Dual oracle manipulation — VWAP oracle pre-poisoned via flash swap, then on-chain AMM oracle manipulated via flash loan — to inflate DEI collateral value and borrow far beyond real collateral worth · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: YES** — the Muon oracle was newly integrated specifically after the first exploit as a security fix (announced live March 19, 2022; exploite...] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: YES** — the Muon oracle was newly integrated specifically after the first exploit as a security fix (announced live March 19, 2022; exploite...]→
causalDeus DAO (DEI lending contract): Flash loan oracle manipulation via Solidly AMM pool → user position liquidation2022-03-15 · $3M · Flash loan oracle manipulation via Solidly AMM pool → user position liquidation · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — newly launched DEI lending contract]→
causalDeus DAO (1st incident): Flash loan → spot price manipulation of Solidex USDC/DEI AMM pool (used as oracle) → user positions liquidated2022-03-15 · $3M · Flash loan → spot price manipulation of Solidex USDC/DEI AMM pool (used as oracle) → user positions liquidated · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — DEI lending contract was newly launched]→
causalAgave DAO + Hundred Finance (dual attack): ERC677 callAfterTransfer() reentrancy — flash loan collateral → nested borrow calls before debt balance update → multi-asset drain2022-03-15 · $12M · ERC677 callAfterTransfer() reentrancy — flash loan collateral → nested borrow calls before debt balance update → multi-asset drain · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: No — established forks; no recent upgrades]→
causalBent Finance: Insider Contract Manipulation (Malicious Balance Adjustment)2021-12-21 · $2M · Insider Contract Manipulation (Malicious Balance Adjustment) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — cvxCRV contract was updated on Nov 30 (the update that enabled the exploit)]→
causalGrim Finance: Reentrancy2021-12-18 · $30M · Reentrancy · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — new fork deployment]→
causalBrincFi: Insider backdoor — rescueTokens() admin drain via ownership transfer + malicious contract upgrade2021-12-14 · $1M · Insider backdoor — rescueTokens() admin drain via ownership transfer + malicious contract upgrade · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — malicious implementation upgrade was the attack vehicle]→
causal8ight Finance: Admin key compromise — private key shared via Facebook chat and Google Drive → treasury drain2021-12-07 · $2M · Admin key compromise — private key shared via Facebook chat and Google Drive → treasury drain · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: No recent changes]→
causalBadger DAO (Bitcoin-yield vaults on Ethereum): Front-end injection (Cloudflare account compromise) → malicious `increaseAllowance()` approvals → vault token drain2021-12-02 · $120M · Front-end injection (Cloudflare account compromise) → malicious `increaseAllowance()` approvals → vault token drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: N — existing vault contracts; the attack vector was the front-end, not a new contract] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: N — existing vault contracts; the attack vector was the front-end, not a new contract]→
causalMonoX: Native token self-swap price inflation — tokenIn/tokenOut identity bypass2021-11-30 · $31M · Native token self-swap price inflation — tokenIn/tokenOut identity bypass · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — MONO token was recently launched (weeks before hack)] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — MONO token was recently launched (weeks before hack)]→
causalSnowdog (SnowdogDAO): Insider front-running — privileged challengeKey knowledge + custom AMM sniping2021-11-25 · $21M · Insider front-running — privileged challengeKey knowledge + custom AMM sniping · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Entire protocol was 8 days old; custom AMM deployed specifically for the buyback] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Entire protocol was 8 days old; custom AMM deployed specifically for the buyback]→
relatedCompound Finance: Governance-introduced bug — updated Comptroller vault incorrectly distributed COMP rewards; any user could call `drip()` to refill the vulnerable vault from the Reservoir2021-09-29 · $147M · Governance-introduced bug — updated Comptroller vault incorrectly distributed COMP rewards; any user could call `drip()` to refill the vulnerable vault from the Reservoir · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Y — bug was introduced by Proposal 62, a fresh Comptroller upgrade] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Y — bug was introduced by Proposal 62, a fresh Comptroller upgrade] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
causalJayPegs Automart (via SushiSwap MISO platform): Supply Chain Attack (Malicious Contractor Code Injection)2021-09-17 · $3M · Supply Chain Attack (Malicious Contractor Code Injection) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — fresh auction contract deployment with injected malicious wallet address]→
causalCream Finance: ERC-777 Reentrancy (Token Integration Vulnerability)2021-08-30 · $19M · ERC-777 Reentrancy (Token Integration Vulnerability) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — AMP token integration added via governance Feb 10, 2021, six months before exploit; the new token type introduced the reentrancy surface] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — AMP token integration added via governance Feb 10, 2021, six months before exploit; the new token type introduced the reentrancy surface] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
causalCream Finance: ERC777 reentrancy via newly integrated AMP token — reentrant `borrow()` before state update2021-08-30 · $19M · ERC777 reentrancy via newly integrated AMP token — reentrant `borrow()` before state update · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: YES** — AMP token integration deployed via governance proposal Feb 10, 2021; exploit Aug 30, 2021. The integration was ~6.5 months old but w...] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: YES** — AMP token integration deployed via governance proposal Feb 10, 2021; exploit Aug 30, 2021. The integration was ~6.5 months old but w...]→
causalPunk Protocol: Unprotected initialize() — delegateCall Forge Address Override2021-08-10 · $9M · Unprotected initialize() — delegateCall Forge Address Override · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — protocol just launched] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — protocol just launched]→
causalPopsicle Finance (Sorbetto Fragola): Fee Accounting Bug — LP Token Transfer Without Reward Checkpoint2021-08-04 · $20M · Fee Accounting Bug — LP Token Transfer Without Reward Checkpoint · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Relatively new deployment]→
causalTHORChain: Fake deposit via fake Asgard vault + malicious memo — Bifrost refund logic abuse2021-07-26 · $8M · Fake deposit via fake Asgard vault + malicious memo — Bifrost refund logic abuse · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — same MCCN Bifrosts, new vulnerability found by different attacker in same unaudited component] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — same MCCN Bifrosts, new vulnerability found by different attacker in same unaudited component]→
causalPancakeBunny (Polygon deployment — polyBUNNY): Flash Loan + Reward Minting Manipulation (Performance Fee Inflation)2021-07-18 · $2M · Flash Loan + Reward Minting Manipulation (Performance Fee Inflation) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — Polygon is a new chain deployment]→
causalTHORChain: ETH Bifrost override loop — msg.value spoofing via wrapped router2021-07-16 · $5M · ETH Bifrost override loop — msg.value spoofing via wrapped router · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — MCCN Bifrosts were a new deployment, never audited] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — MCCN Bifrosts were a new deployment, never audited]→
causalAnySwap (Multichain) V3: ECDSA repeated k-value (same R signature) → MPC private key back-calculation2021-07-10 · $8M · ECDSA repeated k-value (same R signature) → MPC private key back-calculation · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — V3 was new prototype code; MPCNode had a recent patch that introduced the bug]→
causalMerlin Labs (REKT 3): Reward Minting Manipulation (Balance Inflation)2021-06-29 · $330K · Reward Minting Manipulation (Balance Inflation) · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — Alpaca single-asset vaults, described as "test" deployment]→
causalSafeDollar: Infinite Mint via Fee-on-Transfer Reward Accounting Bug2021-06-28 · $248K · Infinite Mint via Fee-on-Transfer Reward Accounting Bug · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — protocol was newly launched] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — protocol was newly launched]→
causalStableMagnet: Malicious Unverified Library (SwapUtils) — Rugpull with Approval Drain2021-06-24 · $27M · Malicious Unverified Library (SwapUtils) — Rugpull with Approval Drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — malicious library was the original deployment] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — malicious library was the original deployment]→
causalAlchemix: Logic bug in alETH collateral accounting — ETH collateral position assigned zero debt → users could withdraw collateral without repaying loan2021-06-16 · $5 · Logic bug in alETH collateral accounting — ETH collateral position assigned zero debt → users could withdraw collateral without repaying loan · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — alETH collateral type was newly deployed]→
causalAutoShark Finance: Flash loan + SharkMinter balance spoofing → excess native token minting2021-06-01 · $745K · Flash loan + SharkMinter balance spoofing → excess native token minting · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — newly deployed protocol (few days old)]→
causalMerlin Labs (REKT 2): Oracle Mispricing2021-05-27 · $550K · Oracle Mispricing · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — priceCalculator was deployed same day as first hack as a fix]→
causalPancakeBunny: Flash loan + spot price manipulation → inflated LP token valuation → excess BUNNY minting2021-05-19 · $45M · Flash loan + spot price manipulation → inflated LP token valuation → excess BUNNY minting · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — VaultFlipToFlip was a new upgrade not audited by Haechi] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — VaultFlipToFlip was a new upgrade not audited by Haechi] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract] || (+1 more matches)→
causalbEarnFi (BvaultsBank): Logic bug — token denomination mismatch between vault and strategy layers2021-05-16 · $18M · Logic bug — token denomination mismatch between vault and strategy layers · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Unknown — rekt report does not specify recent deployment] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Unknown — rekt report does not specify recent deployment]→
causalValue DeFi: Uninitialized Pool Re-initialization (Missing initialized = true)2021-05-05 · $10M · Uninitialized Pool Re-initialization (Missing initialized = true) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — vStake pool was a new deployment (migration from old implementation)] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — vStake pool was a new deployment (migration from old implementation)]→
causalUranium Finance: Math bug — constant product formula check broken by inconsistent parameter change (1000→10000)2021-04-28 · $57M · Math bug — constant product formula check broken by inconsistent parameter change (1000→10000) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Bug introduced in v2 migration ~10 days before exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — Bug introduced in v2 migration ~10 days before exploit]→
causalAlpha Finance / Alpha Homora V2 (leveraged yield farming): Debt accounting manipulation via rounding bug + public `resolveReserve` function + custom "evil spell"; insider knowledge of unannounced sUSD pool required2021-02-13 · $38M · Debt accounting manipulation via rounding bug + public `resolveReserve` function + custom "evil spell"; insider knowledge of unannounced sUSD pool required · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Y — HomoraBankV2 with sUSD pool was newly deployed and not yet publicly accessible] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded: Y — HomoraBankV2 with sUSD pool was newly deployed and not yet publicly accessible] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→
causalYearn Finance (yDAI v1 vault): Flash loan + Curve 3pool spot price manipulation → vault share price arbitrage → DAI drain during migration2021-02-04 · $11M · Flash loan + Curve 3pool spot price manipulation → vault share price arbitrage → DAI drain during migration · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — the vulnerability was enabled by a configuration change (migration fee removal), not a new deployment] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: N — the vulnerability was enabled by a configuration change (migration fee removal), not a new deployment]→
causalCover Protocol (formerly SAFE / SAFE2): Infinite Mint — Blacksmith Farming Contract Withdrawal Bug2020-12-28 · $9M · Infinite Mint — Blacksmith Farming Contract Withdrawal Bug · Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Code newly deployed/upgraded?: Yes — team multisig added new Balancer pool to Blacksmith contract hours before the exploit]→
causalCompounder Finance: Malicious Strategy Contracts — Backdoor Withdrawal (Insider Rug Pull)2020-12-02 · $12M · Malicious Strategy Contracts — Backdoor Withdrawal (Insider Rug Pull) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — 7 malicious strategy contracts were deployed post-audit specifically to enable the rug] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — 7 malicious strategy contracts were deployed post-audit specifically to enable the rug]→
causalPickle Finance: Fake jar injection — missing whitelist in Controller's jar-swap function2020-11-22 · $20M · Fake jar injection — missing whitelist in Controller's jar-swap function · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — ControllerV4 added Oct 23, 2020, post-audit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — ControllerV4 added Oct 23, 2020, post-audit] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 21: Post-Audit Code Change Without Re-Audit]→
causalOrigin Protocol (OUSD): Flash loan + fake token injection → missing mintMultiple() validation → reentrancy → rebase inflation → drain2020-11-17 · $8M · Flash loan + fake token injection → missing mintMultiple() validation → reentrancy → rebase inflation → drain · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the validation bug was introduced during a refactoring pass (gas optimization) shortly before the hack] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — the validation bug was introduced during a refactoring pass (gas optimization) shortly before the hack]→
causalEminence Finance (EMN): Flash loan + bonding curve arbitrage (buy/burn/sell cycle)2020-09-28 · $15M · Flash loan + bonding curve arbitrage (buy/burn/sell cycle) · Audit-deploy gap (RD-F-006 time between audit and deploy) [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — deployed day of exploit] || Audit-deploy gap — alternate field name [via dashboard_risk_factors/Exploited code newly deployed/upgraded?: Y — deployed day of exploit] || Time between audit end and deploy [via cross-hack: Factor 4: Newly Deployed or Unannounced Contract]→